# 1NC

## 1

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the desirability of topical action:

#### The Aff violates this:

#### “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 – Jon M. Ericson, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting – “The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Vote neg for two reasons:

#### First - predictable limits---allowing the aff to pick any grounds for debate makes engagement impossible by skirting a predictable starting point and undermining preparation and research. Radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead: they have incentives to cement their infinite prep by selecting the most one-sided ideas and can choose only orientations toward the word, not praxis with an actor or mechanism. Fairness is an intrinsic good, vital to the practice of debate, and logically prior to deciding any other argument.

#### Second- our Testing warrant:

#### A well-defined resolution is critical to allow an iterative process of argument testing and improvement---this does not require particular forms of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement.

Poscher ‘16

Director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming. Modified for language that may offend)

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.

These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea.

In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the (perspective) ~~view~~ towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case.

It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.

f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives

It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?

One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above.

2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS

The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes.

In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements.

A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached.

The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics.

In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are ~~talking about~~ (discussing) the same concept. An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

#### Our testing arg *link turns* the Aff’s efforts to counter injustice. It’s also a reason to Negate their method based on external offense. Testing is the stronger mechanism for actualizing solvency for Aff and Neg impacts.

Connolly 17

William Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Aspirational Fascism: The Struggle for Multifaceted Democracy under Trumpism, p. 694-777

If a dissident movement is to acquire momentum, the democratic Left must also identify more young leaders in multiple settings who are charismatic in democratic ways and who can inspire large constituencies as they counter the appeal of Trumpian authoritarian charisma. For Trump is a charismatic adversary whose rhetorical effectiveness has not yet been measured adequately by enough of his critics. He and Hitler are both right about one thing: there is a tendency in the professoriate to downplay the role of rhetoric in politics and the ubiquitous importance of the visceral register of culture to public life. We often love writing more than speech. There is thus a corollary reticence to working hard enough to counter a rhetoric organized around authoritarian leadership, militarism, whiteness, and aggressive national assertion with another mode that draws on our higher angels to encourage horizontal modes of organization and an ethos of presumptive generosity as it articulates the differential class, regional, and urban dangers of rapid climate change.

We both need to learn more about Trump and to rebut his rhetorical style with positive styles of engagement. Bernie Sanders shined a bright light here, too. For visceral group identifications do not always and only pass through the filter of a narcissistic leader, as a few steeped in Freudianism may think. They can also be mediated by horizontal connections on both the visceral and refined registers of cultural life— connections forged across a variety of associational meetings, church assemblies, blogs, family gatherings, classrooms, neighborhood groups, school boards, tavern conversations, unions, and so on— as we forge reciprocal ties of presumptive generosity and care.[ 12] Charismatic, pluralizing, egalitarian leaders support such horizontal connections and infusions in the ways they provide Democratic leadership.[ 13] It is possible to improve the internal ethos of the United States while coming to terms more nobly with its new condition in the world, even if the probabilities may point in another direction. Indeed, it is imperative to try to accomplish both together, because failure to do so risks unleashing the vast military power of the country in a series of destructive wars that could be calamitous for the world. Think merely of how climate change— a gathering planetary force massive in destructive power— is subject to denial in part because those who seek to return to an old “greatness” are told that such a return requires the modes of industry, mining, imperial power, triumphalism, and fossil fuel energy that powered growth the last time around.

Trump’s attack upon the media and the professoriate is strategically chosen in this respect. His tweets calling the media “the enemy of the people” and carriers of “fake news” must never be treated lightly. Above all, this is not a site, if there is any site, at which the Left should seek to “accelerate the contradictions” of the order to speed up its collapse.[ 14] The latter route, however unintentionally, is a route to fascism.

Trump’s goal is to trap the media in a bind: he hopes he can win if the media evades the charges he makes; he hopes he can win if they reply simply by correcting the evidence when he endlessly accuses them of fake news. The best strategy, perhaps, is to keep exposing how the Big Lie works, to respond with evidence-based claims to each Lie as you also explain why he pursues it, to play up dramatically how critical a press free from state control or intimidation is to a democratic society, and to explore the real and neglected grievances of those constituencies most tempted to embrace Trump tweets. Yes, the media often deserves intense criticism from the democratic Left for its softness on a neoliberal corporate culture, but the Left must also expose and attack Trumpian intimidation of it. It recently seemed unwise to me, for instance, when a few on the Left reenforced Trump and Putin denials of the Putin intervention in the election with statements that came close to describing this as fake news. The media and professoriate will both be vicious targets of Trump attacks for the next four years (at least), as he deflects attention from his probable collusion with Putin and the failure of his policies to uplift the working class. It is possible for critics on the Left to chew gum and walk at the same time, in this case, to hold the media accountable as you also defend it against vicious Trumpian assaults that could get worse as his false promises continue to encounter harsh realities.

I have doted a bit on the working class not because it could today become the center of a new movement toward egalitarian democracy oriented to both pluralism and the new planetary condition. We do not inhabit a Fordist era in which much of the working class is centered in large factories. That class is now even more dispersed geographically and underorganized into unions. It is often distributed in small clusters in fast-food restaurants, shopping mall stores, janitorial duties, farm work, small factories, prison work, security assignments, subordinate administrative duties, hospital services, and so on. Moreover, its dispersed distribution makes it easier for those outside those circumstances to ignore or deny its grievances, as they look merely at yearly income statistics and fail to register how differences in lifetime income and an evolving infrastructure of consumption make it harder for many with apparently decent incomes to make ends meet. Its very dispersion, disorganization, and uneven geodistribution, however, mean that, intelligently engaged, it could also forge indispensable elements in a vibrant pluralism that has been on the move for a while without its active involvement, a pluralism that can also constitute a key bulwark against aspirational fascism. That is why it is wise to appreciate the working class today as one dispersed minority among others.

**Third- our Preparation warrant:**

**Operating within negotiated statis maximizes in-depth discussions for both teams and the judging community. An in-depth iterative process creates a broader model that moves second and third line strategies from theoretically feasible to practical. Neg responses. Some will be effective, some won’t – but the process alone shifts incentive structures towards more on-point and in-depth approaches. This does not require the Aff argue within a narrow horizon of problem or solution areas – but does work within stasis and prevents the Neg from abandoning the wisdom in-depth case hits. After all, nothing in their model prevents Aff from shifting to 1AC that solely claim “bigotry is bad” or “I think that bigot is bigoted”. Our model better aligns incentive structures for Neg research on critical and cultural theory – improving the depth of every participant’s knowledge on the very subject matter the Aff contends is vital for education.**

## 2

**Next Off – Frame Subtraction:**

#### First – our links:

#### The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.

Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.

Rhetorical resistance

That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice.

The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups.

The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn.

Resistance criticism

Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63).

Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse).

By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance.

What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered:

(1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice.

(2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center?

(3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative.

(4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized.

The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between

resistance and rhetorical criticism.

Rhetorical criticism

As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism.

The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### Our Alt: We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:

#### One – no plan means any part of the 1AC can become the nexus question by the 2AR, we should reciprocally get to conditionally critique their frames and narrow the debate to parts of disagreement by the 2NR.

#### Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.

Williams ‘15

Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. Refusing to say ‘*this* is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making *that* accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.”

----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer)

Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

#### Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme stances strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice

#### Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just defend the stances of the 1AC. There are net benefits to this Alt other than just the Condit cards. It applies to other frames that we’ve critiqued.

## Case

#### ( ) Presumption.

#### The 1AC may be intriguing – but it’s ultimately an academic FYI. There’s a diagnosis, but little discussion of solutions. How does the Aff alter the world ?Arguing that the world shouldn’t ask such questions is a slight to those that live with different material and socio-economic realities... How might the Aff re-distribute privilege.

#### Sure, the 1AC implicitly critiques Topicality – but that alone isn’t a reason to affirm. Vote neg on presumption - K Affs still have solvency burdens.

#### Alt fails and boosts social injustice---cap solves

**Barnett 10**

Clive Barnett – Faculty of Social Sciences and Reader in Human Geography at The Open University.

From Chapter Twelve – “PUBLICS AND MARKETS: What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?” – From the book: The Handbook of Social Geography, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage. Available via http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett\_publicsandmarkets.pdf

In accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting highly moralistic forms of analysis of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing an equally idealized view of the forum as the alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character of neoliberalism that should be the focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206). But it is far from clear whether the theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey’s analysis, the withdrawal of the state is taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality (ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the “movement society”, expressed in the proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back “[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious sects proliferate” (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms “that fill the void left behind as state, powers, political parties and other institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding” (ibid.). What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’ covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of self-ownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights.

#### World’s getting better

Goklany 9**—**Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009, http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE\_INCREASES\_IN\_POPULATION\_AFFLUENCE\_AND\_TECHNOLOGY\_WORSENED\_HUMAN\_AND\_ENVIRONMENTAL\_WELL-BEING.pdf)

Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average human well-being**,** measured by any objective indicator, has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average annual per capita incomes tripled since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

#### Warming irreversible – only cap solves through CCS and a bridge to renewables

Graciela 16 – Professor of Economics and of Statistics at Columbia University and Visiting Professor at Stanford University, and was the architect of the Kyoto Protocol carbon market (being interviewed by Marcus Rolle, freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues and global affairs, “Reversing Climate Change: Interview with Graciela Chichilnisky,” http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/09/2016/reversing-climate-change-interview-graciela-chichilnisky)

GC: Green capitalism is a new economic system that values the natural resources on which human survival depends. It fosters a harmonious relationship with our planet, its resources and the many species it harbors. It is a new type of market economics that addresses both equity and efficiency. Using carbon negative technology™ it helps reduce carbon in the atmosphere while fostering economic development in rich and developing nations, for example in the U S., EU, China and India. How does this work? In a nutshell Green Capitalism requires the creation of global limits or property rights nation by nation for the use of the atmosphere, the bodies of water and the planet’s biodiversity, and the creation of new markets to trade these rights from which new economic values and a new concept of economic progress emerges updating GDP as is now generally agreed is needed. Green Capitalism is needed now to help avert climate change and achieve the goals of the 2015 UN Paris Agreement, which are very ambitious and universally supported but have no way to be realized within the Agreement itself. The Carbon Market and its CDM play critical roles in the foundation of Green Capitalism, creating values to redefine GDP. These are needed to remain within the world’s “CO2 budget” and avoid catastrophic climate change. As I see it, the building blocks for Green Capitalism are then as follows; (1) Global limits nation by nation in the use of the planet’s atmosphere, its water bodies and biodiversity - these are global public goods. (2) New global markets to trade these limits, based on equity and efficiency. These markets are relatives of the Carbon Market and the SO2 market. The new market create new measures of economic values and update the concept of GDP. (3) Efficient use of Carbon Negative Technologies to avert catastrophic climate change by providing a smooth transition to clean energy and ensuring economic prosperity in rich and poor nations. These building blocks have immediate practical implications in reversing climate change and can assist the ambitious aims of Paris COP21 become a reality. MR: What is the greatest advantage of the new generation technologies that can capture CO2 from the air? GC: These technologies build carbon negative power plants, such as Global Thermostat, that clean the atmosphere of CO2 while producing electricity. Global Thermostat is a firm that is commercializing a technology that takes CO2 out of air and uses mostly low cost residual heat rather than electricity to drive the capture process, making the entire process of capturing CO2 from the atmosphere very inexpensive. There is enough residua heat in a coal power plant that it can be used to capture twice as much CO2 as the plant emits, thus transforming the power plant into a “carbon sink.” For example, a 400 MW coal plant that emits 1 million tons of CO2 per year can become a carbon sink absorbing a net amount of 1 million tons of CO2 instead. Carbon capture from air can be done anywhere and at any time, and so inexpensively that the CO2 can be sold for industrial or commercial uses such as plastics, food and beverages, greenhouses, bio-fertilizers, building materials and even enhanced oil recovery, all examples of large global markets and profitable opportunities. Carbon capture is powered mostly by low (85°C) residual heat that is inexpensive, and any source will do. In particular, renewable (solar) technology can power the process of carbon capture. This can help advance solar technology and make it more cost-efficient. This means more energy, more jobs, and it also means economic growth in developing nations, all of this while cleaning the CO2 in the atmosphere. Carbon negative technologies can literally transform the world economy. MR: One final question. You distinguish between long-run and short-run strategies in the effort to reverse climate change. Would carbon negative technologies be part of a short-run strategy? GC: Long-run strategies are quite different from strategies for the short-run. Often long-run strategies do not work in the short run and different policies and economic incentives are needed. In the long run the best climate change policy is to replace fossil fuel sources of energy that by themselves cause 45% of the global emissions, and to plant trees to restore if possible the natural sources and sinks of CO2. But the fossil fuel power plant infrastructure is about 87% of the power plant infrastructure and about $45-55 trillion globally. This infrastructure cannot be replaced quickly, certainly not in the short time period in which we need to take action to avert catastrophic climate change. The issue is that CO2 once emitted remains hundreds of years in the atmosphere and we have emitted so much that unless we actually remove the CO2 that is already there, we cannot remain long within the carbon budget, which is the concentration of CO2 beyond which we fear catastrophic climate change. In the short run, therefore, we face significant time pressure. The IPCC indicates in its 2014 5th Assessment Report that we must actually remove the carbon that is already in the atmosphere and do so in massive quantities, this century (p. 191 of 5th Assessment Report). This is what I called a carbon negative approach, which works for the short run. Renewable energy is the long run solution. Renewable energy is too slow for a short run resolution since replacing a $45-55 trillion power plant infrastructure with renewable plants could take decades. We need action sooner than that. For the short run we need carbon negative technologies that capture more carbon than what is emitted. Trees do that and they must be conserved to help preserve biodiversity. Biochar does that. But trees and other natural sinks are too slow for what we need today. Therefore, negative carbon is needed now as part of a blueprint for transformation. It must be part of the blueprint for Sustainable Development and its short term manifestation that I call Green Capitalism, while in the long run renewable sources of energy suffice, including Wind, Biofuels, Nuclear, Geothermal, and Hydroelectric energy. These are in limited supply and cannot replace fossil fuels. Global energy today is roughly divided as follows: 87% is fossil, namely natural gas, coal, oil; 10% is nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, and less than 1% is solar power — photovoltaic and solar thermal. Nuclear fuel is scarce and nuclear technology is generally considered dangerous as tragically experienced by the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan, and it seems unrealistic to seek a solution in the nuclear direction. Only solar energy can be a long term solution: Less than 1% of the solar energy we receive on earth can be transformed into 10 times the fossil fuel energy used in the world today. Yet we need a short-term strategy that accelerates long run renewable energy, or we will defeat long-term goals. In the short term as the IPCC validates, we need carbon negative technology, carbon removals. The short run is the next 20 or 30 years. There is no time in this period of time to transform the entire fossil infrastructure — it costs $45-55 trillion (IEA) to replace and it is slow to build. We need to directly reduce carbon in the atmosphere now. We cannot use traditional methods to remove CO2 from smokestacks (called often Carbon Capture and Sequestration, CSS) because they are not carbon negative as is required. CSS works but does not suffice because it only captures what power plants currently emit. Any level of emissions adds to the stable and high concentration we have today and CO2 remains in the atmosphere for years. We need to remove the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere, namely air capture of CO2 also called carbon removals. The solution is to combine air capture of CO2 with storage of CO2 into stable materials such as biochar, cement, polymers, and carbon fibers that replace a number of other construction materials such as metals. The most recent BMW automobile model uses only carbon fibers rather than metals. It is also possible to combine CO2 to produce renewable gasoline, namely gasoline produced from air and water. CO2 can be separated from air and hydrogen separated from water, and their combination is a well-known industrial process to produce gasoline. Is this therefore too expensive? There are new technologies using algae that make synthetic fuel commercially feasible at competitive rates. Other policies would involve combining air capture with solar thermal electricity using the residual solar thermal heat to drive the carbon capture process. This can make a solar plant more productive and efficient so it can out-compete coal as a source of energy. In summary, the blueprint offered here is a private/public approach, based on new industrial technology and financial markets, self-funded and using profitable greenmarkets, with securities that utilize carbon credits as the “underlying” asset, based on the KP CDM, as well as new markets for biodiversity and water providing abundant clean energy to stave off impending and actual energy crisis in developing nations, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation for industrial and developing nations. The blueprint proposed provides the two sides of the coin, equity and efficiency, and can assign a critical role for women as stewards for human survival and sustainable development. My vision is a carbon negative economy that represents green capitalism in resolving the Global Climate negotiations and the North–South Divide. Carbon negative power plants and capture of CO2 from air and ensure a clean atmosphere together innovation and more jobs and exports: the more you produce and create jobs the cleaner becomes the atmosphere. In practice, Green Capitalism means economic growth that is harmonious with the Earth resources.

#### Their ivory tower theorization isn’t just D – it’s offense. It’s inaction in the face of social and political violence.

Ruddick ‘15

Lisa - Associate Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago - From the Chapter: “When Nothing Is Cool”- From the Book in The Future of Scholarly Writing: Critical Interventions, edited by Angelika Bammer and Ruth-Ellen Boetcher Joeres (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). – September - Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance part of the card continues to footnote #2 – no text is omitted. This card spans pages 71-76.

Is there something unethical in contemporary criticism? This essay is not just for those who identify with the canaries in the mine, but for anyone who browses through current journals and is left with an impression of deadness or meanness. I believe that the progressive fervor of the humanities, while it reenergized inquiry in the 1980s and has since inspired countless valid lines of inquiry, masks a second-order complex that is all about the thrill of destruction. In the name of critique, anything except critique can be invaded or denatured. This is the game of academic cool that flourished in the era of high theory. Yet what began as theory persists as style. Though it is hardly the case that everyone (progressive or otherwise) approves of this mode, it enjoys prestige, a fact that cannot but affect morale in the field as a whole. The reflections that follow focus largely on English, my home discipline and a trendsetter for the other modern language disciplines. These days nothing in English is "cool" in the way that high theory was in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, you could say that what is cool now is, simply, nothing. Decades of antihumanist one-upmanship (re-raising) have left the profession with a fascination for shaking the value out of what seems human, alive, and whole. Some years ago Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick touched on this complex in her well-known essay on paranoid reading, in which she identified a strain of "hatred" in criticism (8). Also salient is a more recent piece in which Bruno Latour has described how scholars slip from "critique" into "critical barbarity," giving "cruel treatment" to experiences and ideals that non-academics treat as objects of tender concern (239-40). Susan Fraiman's powerful analysis of the academic privileging of a "cool male" intellectual style is concerned with many of the same patterns I consider here. And a full lineage for what follows would go back to two landmark articles of 1987, in which Barbara Christian and Jane Tompkins warned of an element of inhumanity in poststructuralist theory. I hope to show that the kind of thinking these scholars, among others, have criticized has survived the supposed death of theory. More, it encourages an intellectual sadism that the profession would do well to reflect on. Why has it been hard for this community to shift away from norms that confuse sophistication with ruthlessness, even as dissenting voices periodically appear and new trends keep promising to revitalize the field? The pages that follow, in proposing some answers, touch on the secret life of groups. My first focus is an article by Judith Halberstam that embodies a certain bad-boy manner that was fashionable in the 1990s. I then turn to more recent criticism that reflects the same intellectual style. Throughout I use concrete scholarly examples, rather than just generalize about the discipline, because the patterns that concern me can be subtle and hard to spot. Without concrete analysis, I would have little to offer those who sense that there's something wrong with criticism but (as Hiatt says) "can't put their finger on" the problem. Yet the examples are not intended to give the impression that individual scholars are misbehaving. Everyone is responding to the same intellectual force field, one that "appears to have neither head nor center," as Christian wrote in the 1980s when high theory became hegemonic (54). The problem is systemic. Repeatedly, we will find scholars using theory—or simply attitude— to burn through whatever is small, tender, and worthy of protection and cultivation. Academic cool is a cast of mind that disdains interpersonal kindness, I-thou connection, and the line separating the self from the outer world and the engulfing collective. Ultimately I will suggest that within English as a human system, this gestalt works to create a corps of compliant professionals. Novices subliminally absorb the message that they have no boundaries against the profession itself. The theories they master in graduate school are such as to make their own core selves—or what D. W. Winnicott would call their "true selves"—look suspect and easy to puncture analytically. What by contrast is untouchable, and supports a new and enhanced professional self, is what Slavoj Zizek, without apparent irony, has called "the inherent correctness of theory itself." FN2 FN2 "[This series] is neither 'pluralist' nor 'socially sensitive': unabashedly avowing its exclusive Lacanian orientation, it disregards any form of correctness but the inherent correctness of theory itself." This belongs to the front matter of each volume published in the Lacanian scries SIC, edited by Slavoj Zizck and Renata Salccl. Halberstam's article hardly represents the best theoretical work of the 1990s. I begin with this piece because it embodies, almost in caricature, a studied coldness that enjoyed a vogue in that decade and has influenced subsequent criticism. Readers who know the novel The Silence of the Lambs or Jonathan Demme's film adaptation will recall the murderer Buffalo Bill, who fashions a cloak from the skins of his female victims. In a well-known reading of the film, Halberstam suggests that Bill is as much "hero" as villain. For he "challenges the...misogynist constructions of the humanness, the naturalness, the inferiority of gender" (Halberstam 177). By removing and wearing his victims' feminine skin, Bill refutes the idea that maleness and femaleness are carried within us. "Gender," Halberstam explains, is "always posthuman, always a sewing job which stitches identity into a body bag" (176). The corpse, once flayed, "is no woman"; "it has been degendered, it is postgender, skinned and fleshed" (170). Halberstam blends her perspective uncritically with the hero-villain's posthuman sensibility, which she sees as registering "a historical shift" to an era marked by a destruction of gender binaries and "of the boundary between inside and outside" (177).3 In her more responsible, empirical work on gender identities, Halberstam has described some of the ways in which society does "stitch" people into genders that are taken for natural. But in this more fanciful piece, she reads a fictional text allegorically, to suggest that there is no selfhood at all beneath our cultural stitching. For if Bill pulls each victim apart without concern for an "inner life," it is apparently because there is no such thing as an inner life. Not only gender but also "Identity... proves only to be skin deep" (170, 175). Bill "hates identity" and addresses his victims as "it" (164, 170). He enacts "a carnage of identity" (164). Yet the article gives us no terms in which to describe this as unhealthy or cruel behavior. An extensive, diverse academic conversation has, of course, questioned the ideals of the inner life and the bounded individual, on the strength of various critiques of liberal individualism. Some of the most powerful scholarship of the last decades is rooted in this more or less Marxist intellectual tradition.4 Among other things, this work has shown how liberal theory, in presuming that "man" is ideally self-possessed and autonomous, overlooks the shaping influence of the market and of social relationships. Yet antiliberalism has many variants. In its cool variant, it denies the value or even the existence of human individuality and personal self-boundaries— an attitude arguably remote from Marx's own.5 In place of compassion for the fictional victim, Halberstam offers a heady identification with the "hero" who dismantles the victim to the glory of a field-honored theory about the artificiality of gender. The abstractions trump the human realities: this is the mark of sexy academic thought. A reviewer hailed Halberstam's article as modeling "exciting possibilities for feminist and queer criticism of contemporary horror films" (Curtin review 152). And the essay was well enough regarded to have been reprinted in an anthology showcasing posthumanist criticism, and again in the award-winning Transgender Studies Reader (Badmington 58-68; Strykcr and Whittle 574-83). The editors of the latter volume introduce the essay not as an account of a peculiar fictional world but as a theoretical intervention offering a new perspective on the actual nature of subjectivity. They write, "[Halberstam] looks beyond available categories of gendered person-hood and sexed embodiment to develop a new, potentially post-human, construct of the self" (Stryker and Whittle 574). But what is a "construct of the self" that suggests that beneath the skin, no one is home? While no one would say that theoretical work like this should be excluded from the conversation, it seems fair to ask why it should be overvalued. Let us assume a proposition that most American psychoanalysts would find uncontroversial, namely that human beings, unless autistic or seriously troubled, have inner lives—ideally rich ones—and a degree of self-cohesion. As students are brought into our profession, they typically learn to see this view as that of "mainstream psychology," which in turn is fraught with bourgeois ideology (see Gil, "Before Intimacy"). Their theoretical training, as a rule, gives them scant exposure to the many contemporary theories that validate the human potential for inwardness and psychic integrity.6 Instead, they are assigned theories arguing, at an extreme, that the very border between "inner" and "outer" worlds is "maintained for the purposes of social regulation and control."7 They will also occasionally encounter work that uses the profession's radical critique of interiority and autonomy to make the shattering of selves look edgy and progressive. I nowhere mean to suggest that the profession does not offer good criticisms of U.S. ideology. The problem is the scorn for self-cohesion that has wound itself in with the project of social critique. As I have already begun to suggest, an intellectual regime so designed discourages initiates from identifying with their own capacity for centered, integrated selfhood. Some will identify instead with the aggressor, turning against the soft "interiority" that the profession belittles. As a more moderate option, students can adopt a neutral historicist voice that allows them to handle the inner life—someone else's—as a historical curiosity, without attributing value to it. (As one of my interviewees ruefully remarked, "You can write about anything so long as it is dead.")8 Either way, the distanced attitude toward inwardness takes a toll. The management scholar Ann Rippin borrows an image from a fairy tale to describe the "silver hands" with which organizations endow their members. Recruits to professional organizations, Rippin writes, are trained in glossy but dehumanized ways of speaking and feeling. The work they learn to do "is silver service done at arm's length, hygienically, through a polished, highly wrought intermediary instrument." In time, she writes, many of those so socialized "report feeling unable to bring their whole selves to work, [and] being obliged to dismember or disaggregate themselves, having to suspend feelings, ethics, values on occasion" (Rippin 360). I think our profession has its own version of silver-handedness, imprinted in part by theoretical orthodoxies according to which we never had a "whole self" to lose in the first place. Nothing inherently makes the theories that dismiss the idea of integrated selfhood better than the alternatives; they are just preferred by this academic community.9 I believe that when a scholar traffics in antihumanist theories for purposes of professional advancement, his or her private self stands in the doorway, listening in. When it hears things that make it feel unwanted— for example, that it is a "Kantian" or "bourgeois" fantasy—it can go mute. I have spoken with many young academics who say that their theoretical training has left them benumbed. After a few years in the profession, they can hardly locate the part of themselves that can be moved by a poem or novel. It is as if their souls have gone into hiding, to await tenure or some other deliverance. The poststructuralist critique of the self, though associated with progressive politics, has an unobserved (under-discussed), conservative effect on the lived world of the profession. It protects the institutional status quo, by promoting the evacuation of selves into the group. In the story behind the story, the decen-tered subject is the practitioner who internalizes the distaste for the inner life and loses touch with the subjective reserves that could offset his or her merger with the profession. What is correspondingly strengthened is the cohesion of the collective. For our profession, alienated in various ways from the American mainstream, needs members who will band together. One way to get members to commit to the group and its ideology is to make them feel ashamed of the varied, private intuitions and desires that might diversify their interests. I recently surveyed the last nine years of publication in ELH: English Literary History to check my sense of the field against a core sample of contemporary criticism. I chose ELH for review because it is a distinguished, mainstream academic journal, one that does not have biases marking it off from the discipline of English as a whole. (My colleague W. J. T. Mitchell, doubtless speaking for many, writes, "ELH has been the gold standard of literary scholarship for as long as I can remember.")10 More, it is a journal I have long admired myself. The work it selects has a literary-critical delicacy, an erudition, and a relative lack of cant that make for interesting, often surprising reading. I reasoned that if there was an ideological problem in English—pervasively—I would find its imprint even in the best, most flexible (top) journal I could identify and one that could hardly be called doctrinaire. And if I did not find the problem here, that would be informative as well. What I found, overall, was that in the course of the nine-year span, a small but annually growing number of articles challenges the high-theoretical pieties, a pattern that suggests that the much discussed death of theory is not entirely illusory. But if high theory is dead, it still speaks (conveys) from the grave, determining which ideas go without saying and which by contrast require cautious, rigorous defense. As to the question whether it is good or even possible to have a self, I found that the work published in ELH largely—but not unanimously—defers to the field-honored notion that selfhood and privacy either are illusions or are actual experiences that reflect a worthless bourgeois ideology. We often find a left-inflected approbation for whatever is collective and anonymous, sometimes conjoined with a postmodern affinity for what is flat or depthless.

#### Alt fails---Deleuzian resistance is hopeless---their method is a narcissistic fantasy

Mann 95 (Professor of English at Pomona, Paul, “Stupid Undergrounds,” PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)

Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and **merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing**, and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. **To pursue** nomadology or **rhizomatics** as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and **no project is more hopeless**; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself.

#### Vanguard politics---the outcome of the alt is a revolutionary politics---in practice, this only results in tyranny and genocide

Barbrook 98 (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8-27, http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html)

Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the 'deterritorialisation' of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into 'molecular rhizomes', direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was not the 'end of history': the material result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary, the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their hierarchical brainwashing to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool.<21> Yet, as the experience of Frequence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left **vanguard**. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari's dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the 'grand narrative' of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. **Instead, the application** **of such anti-modernism in practice** **resulted in tyranny and genocide**. The 'line of flight' from Stalin had led to Pol Pot.

#### Macro-focus---Deluze crush coalitional struggle, locking in oppression

Best and Kellner 1 (Steven, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Humanities – University of Texas and Douglas, Philosophy of Education Chair – UCLA, “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future,” Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm)

Postmodern politics, following capital and state intervention processes themselves, represents a politicization of all spheres of social and personal existence, which were previously ignored or rejected by modern and Marxist approaches as proper political spaces. With postmodern politics, every sphere of social life becomes subject to questioning and contestation, and the sites of struggle multiply. With the pluralistic approach, power is more vulnerable to attack and hence Foucault emphasized the contingency and frailty of power relations. Where a Leninist would argue that pluralized struggle only dissipates the centralized forces needed to combat capital and the state, a politically radical postmodernist would respond that the new struggles attack the weak links of the system and spread resistance everywhere, thereby allowing for the general attack that Leninists rightly think is necessary for overthrowing capitalism. Hence, the 1960s brought a shift from a macropolitics that focused on changing the structure of the economy and state to a micropolitics that aims to overturn power and hierarchy in specific institutions, and to liberate emotional, libidinal, and creative energies repressed by the reality principle of bourgeois society. An important aspect of micropolitics, as evident in the work of Lyotard, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, is a politics of subjectivity which theorizes the conditions under which the modern subject has emerged as both an effect of power, what Foucault calls the "subjectification" of individuals. This entails primarily a struggle against the "microfascism" latent in everyone, to be combatted by breaking out of, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, the "molar" pole of desire (such as informs all normalized subjectivities) and finding the "molecular" lines of escape. For Foucault, the politics of subjectivity involves a "politics as ethics" which creates new subjects on the Greek model of an "aesthetics of existence."[10] Postmodern models of politics are trying to redefine the "political" based on changes in society, technology, economics, and everyday life. A postmodern cultural politics, building on the insights of Gramsci, the surrealists, Lefebvre, and the situationists, thematizes culture as a crucial terrain of power and struggle. To the extent that social reproduction is now largely achieved at the levels of culture and everyday life, where the individual is a target of total administration, questions of subjectivity, ideology, culture, aesthetics, and utopian thought take on a new importance. The instrumentalist, pragmatic, or rationalist conception of political struggle, which attempts to shape "political consciousness," class or otherwise, and mobilize political insight into a political movement that transcends questions of culture, is insufficient because it begs the question of how a political movement will be possible in the first place, given the degree of subjective identification with dominant modes of thought and behavior throughout society. As thinkers like Reich and Adorno saw, fascism has roots not only in the crisis of monopoly capital, but also in the repression of the instinctual structure and the emergence of an "authoritarian personality." Thus, if people live immersed in a culture colonized by capitalism, a culture of spectacles that binds affect and mobilizes pleasures to its sights, sound, and experiences, then the struggle for culture, subjectivity, and identity is no longer secondary to the struggle for society, and both cultural and identity politics are crucial for breaking from the dominant ideologies and creating new forms of life and consciousness. Given the need to produce new subjectivities, political education, rational persuasion, and moral appeals remain of the greatest importance, but they can be very weak opponents of the seductive pleasures of MTV, blockbuster films, the Internet, fashion and advertising, and commodity consumption of all kinds. In Marcuse's words, "no persuasion, no theory, no reasoning can break this prison [of subjectivity], unless the fixed, petrified sensibility of the individuals is `dissolved,'opened to a new dimension in history, until the oppressive familiarity with the given object world is broken - broken in a second alienation: that from the alienated society."[11] It is culture that molds the sensibilities and thus a radical cultural politics attempts to undo the enculturation of the dominant culture by providing new ways of seeing, feeling, thinking, talking, and being. Progressives today must not simply fall back on the old valorization of critical realism and its narrow cognitive models, as valuable as didactic and pedagogical art might be. What is ultimately needed are new affective structures and modes of experience which can act as catalysts and the condition of the possibility of broader social and political transformations. Here, the political function of critical art becomes, negatively, a defamiliarization from the dominant mode of experiencing reality, what Marcuse has termed an alienation from alienation. Such has been the practice of Brecht's epic theater, Artaud's theater of cruelty, or Godard's anti-narrative films, all of which sought to question and displace the dominant mode of experiencing reality, rather than reproduce it through staid aesthetic conventions. Positively, a cultural politics has the task of "aesthetic education," the reshaping of human needs, desires, senses, and imagination through the construction of images, spectacles, and narratives that prefigure different ways of seeing and living. Situationist art, for example, practiced both functions, the negative through its deconstruction of advertisements and other images (detournement), and the positive through experiences with the "constructed situation," a practice earlier advanced by the surrealists in their various exercises and games (such as "the exquisite corpse") designed to liberate unconscious creative forces. Paradoxically, today we find the atrophy of the senses in their hypertrophic extension throughout the sensorium of the spectacle and its images and commodity empires.[12] Against Lukˆcs, we emphasize the importance of formal innovation and avant-gardism in the arts, where such new techniques and modes of vision can help people break with repressive identifications with both the utilitarian (instrumental reason) and affective (sign value) modes of experience constituted by advanced capitalism. A new society will never be attainable until it is experienced as a need, as a desire for new modes of community, work, experience, social interaction, and relations to the natural world that could never be satisfied within capitalism and therefore cannot be coopted by economic reforms. As Bahro saw,[13] capitalism generates needs and desires it ultimately cannot satisfy for freedom, justice, self-realization, and a good life, and a radical cultural politics will depict both how the current mode of social organization restricts, limits, and deforms desire, freedom, and justice, while projecting visions of how these aspirations could be realized. Both the radical negations of society by certain forms of critical modernism (i.e. Kafka, Beckett, German Expressionism, etc.) and the utopian dimension of art stressed by theorists such as Bloch and Marcuse is thus more relevant than ever today when radical critique is needed to free individuals from forms of oppression of which they are often unaware and when a better way of life is technically possible for all. In addition to cultural politics, postmodern politics has often developed new political strategies and politicized new domains of life. The European autonomous movements that George Katsiaficas, for instance, has described struggle to politicize, among other things, housing and have developed squatters movements to occupy abandoned houses or deteriorating urban neighborhoods.[14] In addition, the automomous movements have been active in local anti-nuclear struggles, attacking local nuclear installations and protesting against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Indeed, throughout the world postmodern politics have affixed themselves to new social movements and localized struggles. The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics, as if it were an either/or proposition, but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives, embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] There are certainly many things to be depressed about is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation. While postmodern politics and theory tend to polarize into either the extremely negative or excessively affirmative, key forms of postmodern literature have a more dialectical vision. Indeed, some of the more interesting forms of postmodern critique today are found in fictional genres such as cyberpunk and magical realism. Cyberpunk, a subgenre within science fiction, brings science fiction down to earth, focusing not on the intergalactic battles in the distant future, but the social problems facing people on earth in the present.[17] Cyberpunk writers such as Bruce Sterling and William Gibson offer an unflinching look at a grim social reality characterized by transnational capitalist domination, Social Darwinist cultural settings, radical environmental ruination, and the implosion of the body and technology, such that humans become more and more machine like and machines increasingly become like human beings. Yet cyberpunk novels foreground this nightmare world in order to warn us that it is an immanent possibility for the near future, in order to awaken readers to a critical reflection on technology and social control, and to offer hope for alternative uses of technology and modes of social life. Similarly, magical realism examines the wreckage of centuries of European colonialism, but also maintains a positive outlook, one that embraces the strength and creativity of the human spirit, social solidarity, and spiritual and political transcendence. Like cyberpunk novels, magical realism incorporate various aesthetic forms and conventions in an eclectic mixture that fuses postmodernism with social critique and models of resistance. But it is also a mistake, we believe, to ground one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory alone. Against one-sided positions, we advocate a version of reconstructive postmodernism that we call a politics of alliance and solidarity that builds on both modern and postmodern traditions. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se, we believe that the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for political struggle today and are skeptical whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics. Yet the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides (such as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in "progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critique of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and modernity are in order, unlike Habermas we believe that postmodern theory has important contributions to make to this project.

#### Their alternative causes a rollback of the State which allows an upsurge in global capitalist control. This turns their critique and has the external impact of balkanization and mass death

Lubyk 2 (Jason, writer for The Thresher and Disinformation and editor of the strange and subversive link Weblog New World Disorder, "Romanticizing the De-Evolution of the State," http://thethresher.com/devo.html)

The use of natural models such as the hive and the rhizome justifies the rollback of the state in a much more visceral and exciting style than those historically employed by right libertarian and left anarchist political ideologues of the Hegelian past. However. Deleuze and Guittari admit that natural does not automatically equate good: "the rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed." (8) The rhizomatic networks that allow for the organization of the Zapatista's struggle (as well as the recent anti-globalization and anti-war protests) against global capitalism also give terrorist groups like Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization their peculiar advantage over state-bound forces. While the upper levels of al-Qaeda are known to be hierarchical — and its ideological goals are an authoritarian, centralized Islamic state their tactic is to use decentralized network of "local cells that operate with |al-Qaeda's] blessing and support, but cannot be easily traced back. Each cell operates independently with its members not knowing the identity of the other cells. If one group is arrested they will not be able to betray others." (9) It was a weird and tragic irony that the decentralized network, the God of the libertarian capitalists, was used by al-Qaeda on 9/11 to strike at the center of global capital, striking a final blow against the already sinking reign of naive 90's style free-market internet capitalism and ushering in a new and more malevolent paradigm. Biological techno-libertarian rhetoric also provided a hip justification for the shrinking of the welfare state and the deregulation of global corporations. Newt Gingrich, appearing on the cover of Wired and writing the introduction to Alvin and Heidi Toffler's book on third-wave governance. Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave, used some of the glossy sheen of the new information age to buff and blind part of the population to some of the grittier details of his "Contract With America," such as increases in defense spending and decreases in environmental regulations. On the Gingrichian "free-market" con, Manuel De Landa states: And so today (1996,) in the United States, there is a very strong political movement, mostly by the right-wing, and Newt Gingrich is perhaps the well known politician in this regards, who are trying, as they say, shrink the size of the government, [to] let the market forces have more room to operate. But of course... what they want to do is let anti-market [De Landa is using economist Ferdinand Braudel's term for top down, hierarchical economic organizations] run wild. They don't really want small producers and small manufacturers and printers and bakers and mom-and-pop shops to have more room to manoeuver and make money. They want national and international corporations to have more room to manoeuver. They want to shrink government so that there is less regulations to keep international and national corporations from doing what they want. (10) In this reality, "Big Government" is not only against nature, it's not cool. Techno-liberation is hip. Liberation of not only corporate anti-markets but of you from the oppression of "Big Government" evils such as the social safety net, labor rights, affirmative action and consumer protection. Non-hierarchical networked societies are a grand ideal. I'm no fan of nosey and anal governments poking their fingers into every act, regulating away all vitality. But a total de-evolution of the state at this time would be M.A.D. Over-optimistic fantasies aside, the techno-libertarian reality is a grim Social Darwinist one. We've already seen how this oligarchy functions, with its networked corporate drone-hives, their virtual trillions circulating the globe out: of the grasp of the Job-like-masses, who've been permanently downsized and temped (pimped) out, suffering for their faith in the market. And far-left/anarchist fantasies about the potential perfection of wo-man (alleged to have lived in harmonious hunter-gatherer, agrarian or even Neolithic golden ages), after the corrupting state is removed, demonstrate an even more unsophisticated form of wishful thinking. Anarchist devolutionists don't only ignore most of the historical and evolutionary evidence, they fail to explain how we could get there from this far away, without killing off the several hundred million people who really want to go shopping at the mall. Really now, any major devolution of the state today is probably going to look cither like Mississippi before the sixties, or the Balkans. Some state interventions buffer the brutality of the markets, and the brutality of us, positively channeling and mitigating against destructive atavisms. A genuinely non-authoritarian, democratic slate can form a collective bulwark against entropy. Around this core of stability, aspects of the spontaneous Gaian superorganism can be modeled and realized; such as creativity, abundance, eros and play.

# 2nc

#### The plan nationalizes the private sector---that transitions the economy to socialism

Foster ’13 [John Bellamy Foster, “Marx, Kalecki, and Socialist Strategy,” April 1, 2013, Monthly Review]

The principal strategic aim of the new Labour government would need to be directed at “changing the power relations in society, by capturing the key centres of the economic, social, and political power of the strongest capitalist groups.” Kalecki argued for “full central public control of banking, and finance, investment and foreign trade, and possibly the allocation of basic raw materials and commodities.” This required “direct social control” of key industrial sectors, either through “full nationalization” or the establishment of “some kind of public corporation.” The most important requirements here were “that those who direct and manage the [public] corporation have no financial interest other than their salaries,” and that if there were any private investors they be allowed “no control over policy or management.”38

All of this, Kalecki recognized, would be strongly resisted by capital, which would use all of its means, including sabotage, to block any changes that threatened its class position. Nevertheless, he argued that if the Labour Party were to exert its full strength at the end of war it would be able to generate a full-employment economy, turning this into a means of further ratcheting up working-class power. “This period, which may be short, will be the one of maximum opportunity for Labour, when full employment has generated a self-confident feeling among workers. Then will be the time to use Labour’s political power to the full; to strike boldly and strike hard. This will be the moment to the lay the basis for that continuing social revolution without which democratic socialist planning will remain a sterile dream.”39

Kalecki’s political-economic strategy for social change was aimed at fatally undermining what Marx had called capital’s main “lever” for the disciplining the working class: the existence of a relative surplus population or industrial reserve army. By removing this lever from capital, it would be possible to alter the rules of the game.40 The maximum response of capital in this class struggle, meanwhile, would be to attempt to generate what Steindl later called “stagnation as policy,” opposing all state policies to check unemployment and even stagnation, and increasing the reserve army of labor in order to preserve the social power of the capitalist class—even at the expense of total profits.41

As it turned out in Britain in the 1940s and thereafter, Labour came to power but did not—even during its maximum influence—exert its full power in a project of class transition in line with the course that Kalecki had proposed.42 With the rise of Thatcherism in Britain and Reaganism in the United States in the 1970s and ‘80s, capital itself, as Steindl observed, sought to break with the political business cycle, putting in its place the regressive “political trend,” now known as neoliberalism. This was an attempt to turn back the clock to a pre-Keynesian-style economic regime aimed at increasing unemployment, in order to squeeze wages and impose greater class discipline on workers. At the same time a financially driven casino economy was opened up for the benefit of capital.43 Full employment and wage inflation were depicted once again as threats to prosperity, in what Steindl referred to as “the return of the Bourbons” in economic theory.44

The economic effects of this restoration of pre-Keynesian economics are evident in the trends in the United State over the last four decades or so. The percentage of production and nonsupervisory workers in total private-sector employment has remained constant at about 83 percent of all workers in both 1965 and 2011. Nevertheless the share of such workers in total private-sector payroll dropped from 76 percent in 1965 to 56 percent in 2011, while their share of GDP fell over the same period from over 30 percent to about 20 percent.45 Under these conditions even a mainstream economist such as Paul Krugman was compelled to declare in 2012, that we are “back to talking about capital versus labor…[an] almost Marxist sort of discussion.”46 Moreover, in trying to discern why full-employment policy is off limits at the top of U.S. society even in the context of deep stagnation and growing inequality, Krugman in his 2012 book End This Depression Now! could find no other rational explanation than the one offered by Kalecki—namely that capital saw full employment as a threat to its total social power.47

In Kalecki’s view, the capitalist class’ entrenched opposition to long-run full employment through government intervention meant that workers had no recourse but to push forward on their own in the struggle for higher wages and full employment and to seek on that basis a full transition to socialism. “Labour,” he warned in 1942,must have no illusions about the great fight that will have to be waged against these [capitalist interest] groups. They will resist fiercely because what is at stake is not so much their profits as their personal and social power, which takes two forms: power in society as a whole, and power over workers’ industry. As long as the first form of power remains, all the efforts of the workers in the factories and through the trade unions to diminish the second form of power can only have limited success. The fight for workers’ rights in industry and for more effective workers’ representation through such things as works’ councils and production committees is, of course, of very great importance and…it has a vital part to play in the total struggle against the capitalists. But it can never be a substitute for the necessary political fight to destroy the power wielded over society as a whole by the great capitalist interest-groups….

Their power is in fact a class power and, as long as this class power remains unbroken, the ability of the leading capitalist groups to run things in their way—and, at worst, to sabotage—is enormous….It can only be broken by destroying not merely their political influence, but what is its real basis, their economic power in the great productive forces over which they exercise practically unchallenged control….

The important thing, however, is that Labour should not be afraid of the consequences of the social revolution within industry, but should make itself master of the situation, not by trying to damp down the mood of the workers, as did the leaders of the Popular Front in France, but by directing it against the opponents of democratic planning.48

Kalecki’s political-economic analysis here was based, as he explained, on an “isolated” capitalist economy.49 As historical events unfolded, not only did the Labour Party fail to act decisively in the working-class interest, but also the increased militarism and imperialism during the Cold War, as he was later to observe, altered the picture considerably. Increased armaments spending produced a higher level of employment than in the pre-war years, while at the same time incorporating a considerable part of the working class within a regressive nationalist-imperialist and chauvinistic project—thereby undermining labor’s capacity to unite to promote its genuine interests in the class struggle.50 In the highly globalized monopoly-finance capitalism of today the contradictions facing the working-class movement are even more complex. Capital in the form of multinational corporations is increasingly mobile globally and able to divide and conquer labor internationally, holding down wages and unit labor costs worldwide as workers of different nationalities are pitted against each other.51

Nevertheless, Kalecki’s arguments on not accepting the economic rationale of the system and insisting on the need to wrest social power from the capitalist class remain crucial today. The danger of the profit-squeeze theory of economic crisis under capitalism has always been that it suggested to workers that the pursuit of their own democratic, egalitarian aspirations led directly to economic slowdown, worsening their situation. As Kalecki put it, “There are certain ‘workers’ friends’ who try to persuade the working class to abandon the fight for wages in its own interest, of course. The usual argument used for this purpose is that the increase of wages causes unemployment, and thus is detrimental to the working class as a whole.”52 This position is visible in the United States today with the debate over whether to introduce a paltry increase in the minimum-wage.53

The arguments that Marx and Kalecki leveled against the profit-squeeze theory of crisis have proven correct not only in their day but ours as well. Decade after decade we have seen a declining share of wages (and total compensation) in U.S. GDP—with the share of the bottom 80 percent of private-sector workers plummeting. At the same time the share of GDP represented by management, supervisory, and other nonproduction employees in the private sector has been rising dramatically.54 Meanwhile, capital’s overall share of income has grown by leaps and bounds. Rather than a stable framework of accumulation, this has led to stagnation, financial instability, and deteriorating conditions for workers.

Kalecki’s political-economic conclusions were in line with those of Marx, who declared, in his opposition to the profit-squeeze argument, that the struggle of workers at every point along the way was a rational one, reflecting the superiority of the political economy of the working class over the political economy of capital. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the working-class struggle was not to strive for this or that gain within the system, but rather to replace the capitalist system with a socialist one controlled by the direct producers. As Marx stated in the closing sentence of Value, Price and Profit: “Instead of the conservative motto: ‘A fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work!’ they [the working class] ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword: ‘Abolition of the wages system!’”55

#### They assume fairness is automatically deployed to exclude---it doesn’t---it just levels the playing field

Burch, 8 - Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law (Elizabeth, “CAFA'S IMPACT ON LITIGATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD” 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2517, May, lexis)

Given this shortcoming, the second procedural justice component is fairness. Fairness arguments are typically offered as policy reasons to trump pursuit of certain reform proposals and aggregate social goals; n101 however, I use fairness here (and in assessing CAFA) as a supplemental constraint rather than a substitute. Employing a deontological conception of fairness to balance utility aids in, not only distributing procedural costs and correcting procedural errors, but also in ensuring that the procedural system does not disproportionately favor or burden plaintiffs or defendants. n102 Put differently, process should disperse the risk of error and the cost of access as evenly as possible. Neither party [\*2535] should have an advantage. n103 This idea of "fairness" as avoiding lopsided distribution of error can be likened to the concept of "neutrality." n104 To be sure, some imparity in distributing risks may be inevitable.

Finally, although analogous to fairness, participation - manifested as adequate representation in the class context - humanizes process. n105 In its simplest form, participation necessitates that those who are bound by a decision have an opportunity to take part (and be heard) in adjudication. n106 Moreover, it encompasses inherent rights to present evidence, observe the proceedings, cross-examine witnesses, and hear the judge's decision. n107 And participation, even in class litigation, affords litigants dignity by granting them a forum in which to tell their story. n108 "Storytelling" has been criticized when used to demonstrate satisfaction with process as a proxy for "justice." n109 I use the term here, however, for its cathartic value only when situated within this larger [\*2536] procedural fairness framework.

#### USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta 00 – Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K <http://encarta.msn.com>

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School 4 – 5-12, “#12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**Tech innovation high --- expanding the scope of antitrust laws stifles it --- Causes China tech dominance**

**Packard 6-22** --- Clark Packard, Trade Policy Counsel, Finance Insurance & Trade, R-Street, “Hamstringing America’s most innovative firms is no way to compete with China”, JUN 22, 2021, https://www.rstreet.org/2021/06/22/hamstringing-americas-most-innovative-firms-is-no-way-to-compete-with-china/

The United States is locked into a **geopolitical competition with China** over the commanding heights of the 21st century economy. Much of the competition revolves around the nexus of international trade and investment and technology. **Washington has very legitimate concerns about China’s pursuit of indigenous innovation through high tech industrial policy**, but the situation warrants a smart response. At a time when policymakers are signaling their desire to outcompete China economically, **why are they also rushing to** ~~hobble~~ **[stifle] private sector American tech**nology **and innovation?**

Over the last several weeks, lawmakers have introduced five separate bills in United States House of Representatives aimed at cracking down on “Big Tech.” I’m not an antitrust scholar, but as my colleague Dr. Wayne Brough has written, the bills would, if enacted, “impose the most significant overhaul of the nation’s antitrust laws in our country’s history.” Rather than broad and durable antitrust principles that apply to all sectors of the economy, which have guided our competition policy for more than a century, the legislation under consideration is aimed squarely at large tech companies in the United States.

It is worth considering the **geopolitical and international economic ramifications of such a radical departure from existing law.**

In 2018, the United States released a report documenting China’s predatory commercial practices, which served as an indictment of sorts. The overarching theme of the report is that Beijing uses a number of unfair and pernicious methods to acquire American technology with the ultimate goal of supplanting the United States as the global leader in high tech innovation. Specifically, the report alleges that China pressures American firms into transferring technology to Chinese joint-venture partners as the cost of doing business—reaching the 1.4 billion potential consumers—in the country; China abuses intellectual property; engages in targeted foreign investment to acquire strategic American firms and assets; and with pervasive state support, hacks into commercial networks to steal trade secrets. On top of that, China provides massive subsidies to its leading technology firms to pursue research and development in critical areas. **These are very serious problems**, and demand a thoughtful and targeted response.

Instead, the United States has flailed at China. The Trump administration imposed tariffs, which triggered predictable retaliation against American exporters, imposed significant costs onto American consumers—both families and firms—and will almost certainly fail to change Beijing’s predatory commercial practices. It is estimated that the tariffs cost about 300,000 American jobs and lowered market capitalization by about $1.7 trillion through diminished investment, according to the New York Federal Reserve. In other words, the tariffs made the United States weaker and less competitive. Now, some in Congress want to pursue misguided antitrust policies that will unintentionally undermine the United States’ global competitiveness.

The firms targeted by the proposed legislation are among America’s **most globally competitive and innovative.** They drive **significant investment in cutting-edge tech**nologies like robotics and artificial intelligence, the types of research China is pursuing through its Made in China 2025 indigenous innovation industrial policy. A recent report from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) highlights how many of the largest American tech firms—Amazon, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Intel, Facebook, Microsoft and Apple—were among the top 15 nonfinancial firms driving U.S. capital expenditures in 2020. Together, PPI estimates that these six firms made nearly $90 billion worth of private investment in 2020—up 6 percent from 2019, which is remarkable considering that the U.S. economy was lagging in 2020 due to the outbreak of COVID-19. Cracking down on these firms will mean less investment in research and development.

These American firms already must compete with heavily subsidized foreign competitors and face discriminatory foreign practices, particularly in China. Despite these hurdles, the American tech industry pushes the envelope on exactly the type of research and development that policymakers in the United States should welcome. These firms lead the world in current and next-generation technologies. Instead of embracing this type of American global commercial and technological leadership, or at least staying neutral toward it, the legislation under consideration would **favor foreign competitors** by [stifling] ~~kneecapping~~ our domestic technology firms with **heavy-handed regulation**, which will almost certainly benefit their foreign competitors.

The American tech industry is the envy of the world. That’s why China, the European Union and others are trying to mimic it through subsidies and discriminatory practices against foreign competition. Yet those policies are no match for a relatively free and dynamic economy fostered by existing competition policies. It simply **belies common sense** that the way to outcompete Beijing is by making the United States **weaker, less efficient and less dynamic through misguided efforts to single out** our most **globally competitive and successful firms**.

#### Causes US-China war --- Only private tech development solves

Talent & Work 19 --- Prepared by Taskforce co-chairs The Honorable Jim Talent Senior Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center Former U.S. Senator (R-MO) and The Honorable Robert O. Work Distinguished Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, et al, “The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition”, Ronald Raegan Institute, Dec 2019, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355297/the\_contest\_for\_innovation\_report.pdf

The United States has entered an era of long-term competition with revisionist powers. A key aspect of this competition will revolve around a contest for technological superiority waged between the national innovation bases of the respective competitors. The outcome of this competition will determine not just American national security but also how the nations of the world interact—and whether a free and open political and economic system will remain the foundation of those interactions.

After a long post-Cold War focus on rogue regional powers and nearly two decades of continuous warfare in the Middle East and a focus on rogue regional powers, the United States now faces a new defining national security challenge: a long-term strategic competition with a resurgent Russia and a rising China.

Russia seeks to reestablish itself as a global power. While Russia is able to compete with the United States militarily in certain domains, its economic outlook and long-term demographic prospects are grim. Accordingly, it is unlikely to develop and nurture a true national innovation ecosystem. Given these disadvantages, Russia is limited to acting as a geostrategic spoiler seeking to undermine and weaken the United States, its alliances, and its global interests.

China, on the other hand, is already challenging the United States economically, militarily, and politically. China’s economy has surpassed that of the United States in terms of purchasing power parity and could, under some scenarios, pass the U.S. GDP in absolute terms in the mid- to late 2020s. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, China defines its vital national interests in ways that are irreconcilable with both the interests of the United States and the values of self-determination and individual freedom to which we and our allies are committed. China’s global expansion, from both a trade and military perspective, is challenging the United States in virtually every region of the world.

In pursuit of its goal of reshaping the world order, China aims to supplant the United States as the world’s leading technological power by 2030. China has articulated a distinct strategy of state-driven innovation, defined by its concept of “military-civil fusion,” to lead the world in cutting-edge technologies that might allow it to leapfrog the United States both economically and militarily.

That strategy presents a two-fold challenge for the United States. Economically, the challenge is to sustain American prosperity and access to markets on equal terms with other nations against China’s ambition to control the economic sectors that will determine national primacy in the decades ahead.

Militarily, the fundamental mission of the U.S. government (USG) is to deter a great-power war and, if deterrence fails, to prevent escalation of the conflict and end the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. An important key to this mission is achieving and maintaining military-technical superiority. However, over the last several decades, China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—has invested heavily in advanced military capabilities specifically aimed at overcoming the technological lead of America’s armed forces.

As a result, the conventional overmatch that the United States has relied upon to undergird its deterrence posture since the end of the Cold War is eroding. The balance of power in East Asia has already shifted substantially in China’s direction. If this trend continues, effective deterrence in that region will likely fail, leaving the United States to face the unattractive alternatives of accepting aggression against its interests or its allies or triggering armed conflict with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with all the attendant risks of escalation.

The National Security Strategy recognized the importance of technological innovation to every domain of the competition with China. Consistent with that, a key theme of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is that the U.S. military must move rapidly to arrest further erosion of its technical advantage and then restore and maintain a comfortable conventional overmatch.

Unfortunately, the technological development relevant to national security is no longer exclusively or even primarily in the control of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its prime contractors.

In the past, cutting-edge technology was usually developed by the government sector for military use and then migrated into the civilian sector. Today, the direction of innovation has reversed. Many of the technologies most important to national security are being developed and produced for civilian purposes by civilian actors who have no history with or connection to the national security community. China is aware of this new reality. Its policy of military-civil fusion seeks to better exploit dual-use technologies originating from the commercial sector. To avoid a ~~crippling~~ [devastating] competitive disadvantage, the United States must adopt means to accomplish the same end.

# 1NR

## Link

### Motives

**Defense – each decision’s complex. Offense – assuming bad motives cements disastrous politics.**

**Robson ‘13**

Geoff – full-time Staff at the University of Canterbury, “How to poison your relationships in one easy step: Always assume the worst” – Every Thought Captive – April 17, 2013 – <http://geoffrobson.com/2013/04/17/how-to-poison-your-relationships-in-one-easy-step-always-assume-the-worst/>

Why assuming the worst about other people’s motives is so deadly – and how we can break the cycle. Few things are as complicated, contentious or corruptible as our motives. French thinker Francois de la Rochefaucauld captured the reality of the human condition when he said, “We would frequently be ashamed of our good deeds if the world could see the motives that produced them.” Samuel Johnson summed up the heart of the problem even more succinctly: “Actions are visible, but motives are secret.” The Bible is littered with warnings about our motives. When informing Samuel that David was his choice for King of Israel, God told him: “The LORD sees not as man sees: man looks on the outward appearance, but the LORD looks on the heart.” (1 Sam 16:7) Much of Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount is spent warning his hearers against doing outwardly impressive acts with inwardly corrupt motives (Matt 6:1-18). And in Paul’s celebrated (but often misunderstood) chapter on love, 1 Corinthians 13, he tells us that even the best actions are worthless if done without love. Our motives are so important, but so easily corrupted. Yet as tricky as motives are, there’s one sure way to make the whole issue even more complicated, hurtful and destructive: judge the motives of other people as harshly and as negatively as possible. If you’re like me, you’ll know how easy it is to fall into this trap. Sometimes it can be subconscious. “Last time someone did that to me, it meant this – so it must mean this again.” Or perhaps, “If I did that, it would mean this, so because you did that it must mean this too.” Sometimes our ability to judge others fairly is impacted because we’re hurting, so we take it out on those around us. Maybe we’ve been burned before, and don’t want to be hurt again. Maybe we’re exhausted, and our judgment suffers. Or maybe there’s really no excuse and we’re just plain sinful. Whatever the cause, pre-**judging the motives of others or assuming the worst about someone else is a recipe for relational disaster.** Every day, we observe other people’s actions or find ourselves receiving end of the consequences of those actions. Your husband gets home late from work – again! Your colleague makes a big decision that you don’t understand. Your friend fails to share that important piece of news with you. Countless possible actions – but we don’t always know why. “Why did he do it?” “What was she thinking?” And for many of us, rushing to judgment and thinking the worst of people is an all-too-easy response. Certainly, we need to beware of the opposite danger: a foolish naivety that prevents us from grasping the realities of sin or that leads us to wrongly assume that ‘what you see is what you get’ or ‘I’m sure they didn’t mean anything by it’. Living in a broken world requires great wisdom and balance. However, applying some shrewdness and common sense to our relationships is one thing. Assuming that people are operating with sinister, ulterior motives is quite another. When we fall into the trap of attributing motives and thinking the worst of others, the damage to our relationships – and to our very selves – can be massive. We’ll alienate the people around us and impair our ability to relate to them with love, kindness and generosity of spirit. We’ll find ourselves being civil to people on the outside, but inwardly nurturing resentment and using the voice in our head to curse them. We’ll infect our churches or ministries with unnecessary anger and distrust. We’ll become unable to lovingly and humbly rebuke others when that really is needed (cf. Gal 6:1). We’ll start to think of ourselves as being superior – focusing on the (perceived) sin in others’ lives, rather than the real sin in our own lives (cf. Matthew 7:1-5). We’ll miss the reality that while no one is perfect, God works in people’s lives and enables them to ‘love one another earnestly from a pure heart’ (1 Peter 1:22). Perhaps most of all, we’ll give bitterness a foothold – and the more bitter we become, the more our default position will be to think badly of others. A cycle of destruction and hurt that feeds on itself is created.

# Case

### Laundry List

#### Free market capitalism is vital to preventing extinction and ensuring equality and value to life – also solves disease and poverty

Rockwell ‘2

(Llewellyn H., President of the Mises Institute, The Free Market, “Why They Attack Capitalism”, Volume 20, Number 10, October, http://www.mises.org/freemarket\_detail.asp?control=418&sortorder-articledate)

If you think about it, this hysteria is astonishing, even terrifying. The market economy has created unfathomable prosperity and, decade by decade, for centuries and centuries, miraculous feats of innovation, production, distribution, and social coordination. To the free market, we owe all material prosperity, all our leisure time, our health and longevity, our huge and growing population, nearly everything we call life itself. Capitalism and capitalism alone has rescued the human race from degrading poverty, rampant sickness, and early death.

In the absence of the capitalist economy, and all its underlying institutions, the world’s population would, over time, shrink to a fraction of its current size, in a holocaust of unimaginable scale, and whatever remained of the human race would be systematically reduced to subsistence, eating only what can be hunted or gathered.

And this is only to mention its economic benefits. Capitalism is also an expression of freedom. It is not so much a social system but the de facto result in a society where individual rights are respected, where businesses, families, and every form of association are permitted to flourish in the absence of coercion, theft, war, and aggression.

Capitalism protects the weak against the strong, granting choice and opportunity to the masses who once had no choice but to live in a state of dependency on the politically connected and their enforcers. The high value placed on women, children, the disabled, and the aged— unknown in the ancient world—owes so much to capitalism’s productivity and distribution of power. Must we compare the record of capitalism with that of the state, which, looking at the sweep of this past century alone, has killed hundreds of millions of people in wars, famines, camps, and deliberate starvation campaigns? And the record of central planning of the type now being urged on American enterprise is perfectly abysmal.

### Human Rights

**Capitalism and human rights are tied together. The same factors that promote economic growth are critical to protect rights.**

**Davis ‘13**.

(Managing director and cofounder of the private equity firm Charlesbank Capital Partners, LLC. He is chairman of the Baltic American Freedom Foundation, a trustee of Freedom House, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations*.*) (Kim Davis, Freedom House, Promoting Human Rights through Economic Development, 3-5-2013, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/promoting-human-rights-through-economic-development, accessed 7-8-2018, EQ)

One remarkable aspect of the annual survey is that while the countries listed as Free vary greatly in terms of size, geography, ethnic composition, religious diversity, and history, they all share one common feature: a market-based economy.

That simple fact is inconvenient for many in the human rights arena who are instinctively suspicious of capitalism. It is also somewhat inconvenient for American policymakers who, despite the rhetoric, have neglected the critical role that well-functioning market economies can play in building broad support for a strong civil society and an independent, empowered judiciary. A better understanding of the deep interconnection between economic development, growing market economies, and human rights would serve as a logical strategic overlay to U.S. foreign policy in this area and inform the specifics of the administration’s economic development tactics.

Tension between supporters of human rights and the business community is fairly common, but it often leads both groups to ignore the important underlying principles that unite them. At the most simplistic level, the best guarantor of human rights is a political system grounded in capitalism. A market-based economy can only work with a clear rule of law and an independent judiciary that enforces the legislation regulating corporate behavior vis-à-vis other corporations, consumers, and the state. The same sort of judiciary is necessary to guarantee human rights. A market economy and human rights both set limits on the authority of the state and empower individuals: they are two sides of the same coin.

Human rights activists are often uncomfortable with capitalism. They are tenacious defenders of universal rights and principles of equality. While capitalism is built on the notions of competition and equality of opportunity, it certainly does not envision equality of result. Capitalism creates winners and losers, bosses and employees, landlords and tenants—fundamentally unequal relationships. But those relationships are based on contractual agreements and require rules of the road, enforcement mechanisms, and neutral forums where parties can adjudicate differences. Democracy and capitalism coexist and strengthen each other when the rules that control market activities are written through democratic processes, and at the same time, economic power is not controlled by the government.

Capitalism is the only form of political economy that can produce an independent power center to function as a critical check on government. However, capitalism without democracy will inevitably move toward monopolistic exploitation, cronyism, and the corruption of government officials. (Think China.) And democracy without capitalism is simply authoritarianism waiting to happen, with a stagnant economy as a bonus. (Think Venezuela.)

To be sure, democratic capitalism is as much about the right rules of the road as it is about competition. The very process of drawing and redrawing boundaries around raw market forces promotes a sense of community and legal rights. If individuals are not secure in their property, and if they view the government as controlling their economic fate, then their hold on basic human rights is tenuous at best. Trading political freedom for economic security is always a bad long-term bargain.

U.S. public support for active diplomacy is low and declining, no doubt a consequence of collective exhaustion with the country’s engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq and the protracted budgetary battles in the capital. This exhaustion is intensified by the artless and incorrect use of terms like “democracy promotion” and “nation building” to describe what amounted to misguided military adventurism and poorly conceived strategies for managing admittedly difficult postconflict transitions.

While more than 80 percent of Americans are supportive of efforts to control nuclear proliferation, combat terrorism, and secure the nation’s energy supplies, less than 30 percent believe in promoting economic development abroad and helping other countries build democracies. But the goals most Americans support are best secured not by a narrow focus on short-term security issues, but by long-term, patient efforts to increase the number of capitalist democracies. On the nuclear issue, for example, it is not so much the weapons themselves as the nature of the regimes pursuing them that presents a threat to global security.

One of the most difficult achievements in a developing or transitional country is for the political system to accept reduced control over the economy, especially when the state or political elite has been a participant in and beneficiary of managed economic outcomes. A thriving private sector can smooth the path to this goal while increasing general prosperity, which is why economic development assistance can be such a powerful tool.

As the administration reassesses its foreign assistance strategy, the tactics with respect to economic assistance and development need to reflect the following realities:

1) Economic development or transition is not a sequential process in which business formation can occur only after acceptable levels of physical and institutional infrastructure have been established. In fact, a growing private sector is often an important constituency that can help foster political receptivity to a strong rule of law and other core elements of both capitalism and democracy.

2) Economic growth depends largely on investment and business formation. There can be no robust, growing economy without adequate credit and investment capital for small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) that have the potential to expand beyond the microenterprise level (“the sewing-machine paradigm”) and create a sustainable business model and source of employment. Furthermore, most external sources of capital, whether the World Bank or various other international development banks, are simply too bureaucratically rigid to respond to the rapidly changing needs of the SME sector. Even the United States, with the most sophisticated and extensive capital markets in the world, struggles to ensure that adequate capital flows into SMEs. Clearly, we should expect this problem to exist in transitional economies, and it should be considered an area of intense focus and great opportunity.

3) There are several impediments to indigenous capital-market development. Almost invariably, commercial banks are content to act as deposit-taking institutions, dispense favors to select government cronies, and invest a large part of their asset base in both domestic and foreign government-issued bonds. Even if these banks were inclined to pursue traditional financing activity, they are often hampered by a lack of trained investment officers and unclear and unstable legal regimes, which undermine the value of enforcement mechanisms, such as foreclosure rights.

4) Economic growth needs to occur as a function of local market participants and not solely in response to grand designs about what sectors of the economy should be encouraged. Often the best economic development strategy is to provide the facilitating financial support and the institutional framework so that the private sector can have access to the necessary capital to fund and grow its businesses.

5) The absence of sufficient capital for the private sector is not an indicator of the absence of commercially viable investment opportunities. It is often true that perception of risk long outlasts the reality of risk, and businesses can flourish even in very fragile environments.

As these five realities imply, economic development is not a simple policy goal to pursue. Of course, neither is the defense of human rights. The critical insight is that in pursuing its foreign policy objectives, the United States needs to recognize the interdependence of these two goals. Human rights are in large part about checking abuses of power, and those same checks can also serve to curb corruption and other manipulations of the market by government officials.

Democratic capitalism is a robust and flexible model. Each version is the unique product of a particular country’s political and economic history, but all versions represent the best guarantor of human rights we know of. Now is the time for the United States to recommit itself to this model. If President Obama and Secretary Kerry can leave office with more countries in the Free column than when they took their oaths, they will have given the world a valuable and lasting legacy.

### Environment

#### Capitalism solves the environment

Follet and Tupy 16 (Chelsea, Cato Institute Researcher and Managing Editor of HumanProgress.org., and Marian, editor of HumanProgress.org and a senior policy analyst at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, 2/17/16, “Capitalism Is Feeding a Hungry World”, https://fee.org/articles/capitalism-is-feeding-a-hungry-world/, AZG)

Forbes magazine recently published “Unless It Changes, Capitalism Will Starve Humanity by 2050,” by Drew Hansen. A businessman and regular contributor to Forbes, Hansen starts out by claiming that capitalism has “failed to improve human well-being at scale.” Over the last few decades, however, hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of extreme poverty. In fact, the share of the world’s population, as well as the total number of people living in poverty, is at an all-time low, despite a population increase of 143 percent since 1960. The left-leaning Brookings Institution predicts that absolute poverty will have been practically eliminated throughout the world by 2030. If this is not good news what is? Hansen argues capitalism is responsible for widespread destruction of animal species, decimation of forests, and a growing risk of starvation. Let’s examine each of Hansen’s three claims in turn. 1) Hansen claims that “species are going extinct at a rate 1,000 times faster than that of the natural rate.” Journalist and Human Progress advisory board member Matt Ridley rebuts this claim in his book The Rational Optimist: There is no doubt that humans have caused a pulse of extinction, especially by introducing rats, bugs and weeds to oceanic islands at the expense of endemic species… But now that most of these accidental introductions to islands have happened, the rate of extinctions is dropping, not rising, at least among birds and mammals. Bird and mammal extinctions peaked at 1.6 a year around 1900 and have since dropped to about 0.2 a year. Ridley also notes that the extinction rate has fallen even farther in the most industrialized countries, where people tend to care more about environmental stewardship. Capitalism, by creating wealth and enabling humanity to move past worries of basic survival, has helped us to preserve other species. 2) Hansen says that 6 million hectares of forest are being lost every year. While forest area is slowly declining, there are plenty of reasons for optimism. In a recent paper for the Breakthrough Institute, environmental scientist Jesse H. Ausubel describes how forests rebound as countries grow wealthier and their populations come to care more about the environment: Foresters refer to a “forest transition” when a nation goes from losing to gaining forested area. In 1830, France recorded the first forest transition. Since then, while the population of France has doubled, French forests have also doubled. In other words, forest loss decoupled from population. Measured by growing stock, the United States enjoyed its forest transition around 1950, and, measured by area, about 1990. The forest transition began around 1900, when states such as Connecticut had almost no forest, and now encompasses dozens of states. 3) Citing the 2014 US Census, Hansen notes that 15 percent of Americans live in poverty. (The Census defines poverty as an income of less than $12,071 a year for a single-person household, or $33 a day). But, what does it mean to be poor in America? As economist Steve Horwitz writes, “

### Inequality

#### Cap solves inequality – prefer a global scale

Cowen 14 (Tyler, professor of economics at George Mason University, 7/19/14, “Income Inequality Is Not Rising Globally. It's Falling.”, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/upshot/income-inequality-is-not-rising-globally-its-falling-.html, AZG)

Income inequality has surged as a political and economic issue, but the numbers don’t show that inequality is rising from a global perspective. Yes, the problem has become more acute within most individual nations, yet income inequality for the world as a whole has been falling for most of the last 20 years. It’s a fact that hasn’t been noted often enough. The finding comes from a recent investigation by Christoph Lakner, a consultant at the World Bank, and Branko Milanovic, senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study Center. And while such a framing may sound startling at first, it should be intuitive upon reflection. The economic surges of China, India and some other nations have been among the most egalitarian developments in history. Of course, no one should use this observation as an excuse to stop helping the less fortunate. But it can help us see that higher income inequality is not always the most relevant problem, even for strict egalitarians. Policies on immigration and free trade, for example, sometimes increase inequality within a nation, yet can make the world a better place and often decrease inequality on the planet as a whole. International trade has drastically reduced poverty within developing nations, as evidenced by the export-led growth of China and other countries. Yet contrary to what many economists had promised, there is now good evidence that the rise of Chinese exports has held down the wages of some parts of the American middle class. This was demonstrated in a recent paper by the economists David H. Autor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, David Dorn of the Center for Monetary and Financial Studies in Madrid, and Gordon H. Hanson of the University of California, San Diego. At the same time, Chinese economic growth has probably raised incomes of the top 1 percent in the United States, through exports that have increased the value of companies whose shares are often held by wealthy Americans. So while Chinese growth has added to income inequality in the United States, it has also increased prosperity and income equality globally. The evidence also suggests that immigration of low-skilled workers to the United States has a modestly negative effect on the wages of American workers without a high school diploma, as shown, for instance, in research by George Borjas, a Harvard economics professor. Yet that same immigration greatly benefits those who move to wealthy countries like the United States. (It probably also helps top American earners, who can hire household and child-care workers at cheaper prices.) Again, income inequality within the nation may rise but global inequality probably declines, especially if the new arrivals send money back home. From a narrowly nationalist point of view, these developments may not be auspicious for the United States. But that narrow viewpoint is the main problem. We have evolved a political debate where essentially nationalistic concerns have been hiding behind the gentler cloak of egalitarianism. To clear up this confusion, one recommendation would be to preface all discussions of inequality with a reminder that global inequality has been falling and that, in this regard, the world is headed in a fundamentally better direction. The message from groups like Occupy Wall Street has been that inequality is up and that capitalism is failing us. A more correct and nuanced message is this: Although significant economic problems remain, we have been living in equalizing times for the world — a change that has been largely for the good. That may not make for convincing sloganeering, but it’s the truth. A common view is that high and rising inequality within nations brings political trouble, maybe through violence or even revolution. So one might argue that a nationalistic perspective is important. But it’s hardly obvious that such predictions of political turmoil are true, especially for aging societies like the United States that are showing falling rates of crime. Furthermore, public policy can adjust to accommodate some egalitarian concerns. We can improve our educational system, for example. Still, to the extent that political worry about rising domestic inequality is justified, it suggests yet another reframing. If our domestic politics can’t handle changes in income distribution, maybe the problem isn’t that capitalism is fundamentally flawed but rather that our political institutions are inflexible. Our politics need not collapse under the pressure of a world that, over all, is becoming wealthier and fairer. Many egalitarians push for policies to redistribute some income within nations, including the United States. That’s worth considering, but with a cautionary note. Such initiatives will prove more beneficial on the global level if there is more wealth to redistribute. In the United States, greater wealth would maintain the nation’s ability to invest abroad, buy foreign products, absorb immigrants and generate innovation, with significant benefit for global income and equality. In other words, the true egalitarian should follow the economist’s inclination to seek wealth-maximizing policies, and that means worrying less about inequality within the nation. Yes, we might consider some useful revisions to current debates on inequality. But globally minded egalitarians should be more optimistic about recent history, realizing that capitalism and economic growth are continuing their historical roles as the greatest and most effective equalizers the world has ever known.

### Poverty

#### Capitalism solves poverty – aggregate data

Arie 18 (Benjamin, writer for Conservative Tribune, 6/27/18, “Extreme Poverty Has Dropped From 94% of World Pop. to 9.6% Thanks to Capitalism”, https://www.westernjournal.com/ct/extreme-poverty-has-dropped-from-94-of-world-pop-to-9-6-thanks-to-capitalism/, AZG)

Capitalism improves people’s lives and has changed the world for the better — but you won’t find many leftists admitting it any time soon. Instead, free-market economics are often blamed for causing the world’s ills, instead of curing them. Take one look at how close openly socialist Bernie Sanders came to being the Democrats’ nominee in the last presidential election to see that capitalism is bizarrely demonized instead of celebrated. It’s the same story in many European countries, while even our neighbors in Mexico appear poised to elect a far-left and socialist-leaning candidate as president on July 1. “The rich are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer,” is the claim of anti-capitalists everywhere. But is it true? Not according to the facts. It turns out that worldwide poverty is declining at an incredible rate, and Western-style capitalism is the main reason. “The speed of poverty alleviation in the last 25 years has been historically unprecedented,” explained the Foundation for Economic Education, a pro-freedom think tank. “Not only is the proportion of people in poverty at a record low, but, in spite of adding 2 billion to the planet’s population, the overall number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen, too,” FEE continued. The numbers speak for themselves. “In 1820, 94 percent of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty,” pointed out Alexander Hammond, a researcher for HumanProgress.org. “In 1990, this figure was 34.8 percent, and in 2015, just 9.6 percent.” We think of the 1800s as “olden times,” but in the large scheme of history and human events, it really wasn’t that long ago. Most of human history, if we’re being honest, was marked by poverty and suffering by the vast majority of people on Earth. Lifespans were short and existence was brutal. Death, frustration, and sadness was the norm, not the exception. Just 200 years ago, almost all of the world’s population was resigned to live in poverty with no way out. There were a handful of elites — mainly the aristocracy — who were able to live relatively well, but even that “luxury” living was rough and uncomfortable by our modern standards. Then something changed — capitalism spurred advancement, and it wasn’t limited to just the elite. “In the last quarter century, more than 1.25 billion people escaped extreme poverty. That equates to over 138,000 people being lifted out of poverty every day,” FEE explained. “If it takes you five minutes to read this article, another 480 people will have escaped the shackles of extreme of poverty by the time you finish.” “In order to help the poorest, consider the impact free-market capitalism has had in the last 200 years in alleviating extreme poverty,” the foundation continued. “The Industrial Revolution turned the once-impoverished Western countries into abundant societies. The new age of globalization, which started around 1980, saw the developing world enter the global economy and resulted in the largest escape from poverty ever recorded.” To put it simply, the rich may be getting richer … but the poor are also getting richer. The foundation pointed to India as a prime example of how Western principles and capitalism are accelerating people out of poverty at a rate that is historically unprecedented. “Since its economic liberalization reforms in 1991, India’s average income has increased by 7.5 percent per year,” FEE explained. “That means that average income has more than tripled over the last quarter century. As wealth increased, the poverty rate in India declined by almost 24 percent.” “It is the people at the very bottom of the social strata who are getting richer faster,” the foundation summarized. At a time when it’s in vogue to bash capitalism and embrace disastrous socialism, it’s important to step back and look at the bigger picture. Life is getting dramatically, measurably better in almost every part of the world, and Western capitalist principles are at the center of that renaissance.